

**“Breaking News”:
An Analysis of Canadian Media’s use of
“Terrorism” and “Human Rights” Frames in the Coverage of the
First Year of the Second Intifada**

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Introduction

Media narratives of the Israel-Palestine conflict do not lack in villains; even a preliminary search through media headlines demonstrates that all actors are portrayed as culpable. However, the media's moralization of the conflict has been in flux and lacks clear dichotomies between images of the victim, and the villain. Rather, phases of vilification usually occur, often as a response to the latest eruption of violence or incursion. This is especially so of the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas. Hamas is primarily seen by Palestinians as a resistance group, but by many more outside of Palestine as a terrorist group.¹ The Canadian public and academics alike have struggled to construct a durable definition of Hamas since its inception in 1987. Raising questions of self-governance, sovereignty, human rights, terrorism, and occupation, Hamas's role in the Israel-Palestine conflict has been a highly charged and divisive topic. Increasingly, the conflict in Israel-Palestine has been fought through careful image management, rather than by weapons arsenals alone, with all sides attempting to garner greater international sympathy and legitimacy. Raging in a "grey zone" in which victims of violence are difficult to differentiate from perpetrators, the Israel-Palestine conflict has produced many contradictory narratives. Multiple narratives are often dispersed across Canadian media coverage in reflection of each news outlet's respective political orientation and editorial line. This thesis does not aim to interrogate the criminality or innocence of the state of Israel or the Palestinian opposition, nor does it intend to dictate how the reader should understand or encode the conflict. However, it

¹ The term "Western media" is used throughout this thesis to refer to countries who use a variant on the Liberal media model, and share similar media values, pegs, and proxies. The author acknowledges that this term is purely a concept, and important specificities differentiate the lived realities of persons dispersed through the "West." However, the term is used as an analytical category to help situate the Canadian case study within the broader experience of medias in this period.

does rest on the assumption that violent acts resulting in the death or injury of non-combatants have been committed by all actors.

Extent analysis of media coverage of the Middle East tends to take 9/11 as its starting point. On the morning of September 11th, 2001, nineteen members of the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial airplanes, flying them into targets such as the World Trade centre in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing the death of over 3,000 people.² More than a decade later, people are still attempting to make sense of the images they witnessed live on their television screens. It is widely recognized that 9/11 changed Western news media. Analysts argue that coverage of “terrorism” significantly increased, the frames used shifted, and media coverage became more pejorative, racist, and fear-driven.³ Yet, less scholarship exists on the nature of “terrorism” reporting prior to 9/11. The “terrorism” frame existed prior to 9/11. However, the term was used differently. For example, prior to 9/11 “terrorism” was used to refer to activities of the radical left and European separatists movements, as well as religiously motivated attacks. After 9/11, the use of “terrorism” in the media has come to refer to an increasingly narrow set of criteria. In the post-9/11 period, “terrorism” is most often used by media to reference activities of Muslim or Arab individuals or groups, and is less frequently applied to individuals or groups outside of those perimeters. This thesis questions whether the narrowing of the definition of “terrorism” had already begun in Canadian media prior to 9/11, and explores how events prior to 9/11, such as the violence of the Second Intifada,

² Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just, eds, *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003): 12.

³ Ruth DeFoster, “Orientalism for a New Millennium: Cable News and the Specter of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 39, no. 1 (2015): 64.

shaped Canadian media's interpretations and framing of terrorism. By identifying instances of "terrorism" framing in Canadian media prior to 9/11, this thesis aims to situate post-9/11 framing within a broader history.

This thesis takes issue with the fundamental structure of narrative representation, highlighting how the conventions of a genre, such as news media, can distort understandings of events that cannot simply fit into traditional narrative structures. I am acutely aware that my criticism of narrative is organized in a narrative format, and despite my efforts, may very well reproduce the faults I have critiqued. I am far from ready to discount narrative as a form entirely, but rather aim to illustrate, as scholars such as Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit have, that narratives and frames are constructed, and are reflective of the environment and time in which they are produced.⁴ Further, deconstruction of the underlying assumptions surrounding Hamas and the conflict in Israel-Palestine may help us to understand and question our own assumptions about the media, and the people it portrays. This narrative does not claim to be inclusive or representative of all aspects of the discourses circulating before 9/11. At best, this thesis represents a small sliver how of *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* framed the events in Israel-Palestine before 9/11. This sliver is a dominant narrative, not because it was the most pervasive or widely held, but because it was advanced by those who hold power and influence. Ideally, the viewpoints of Canada's Indigenous people, French communities, and the diverse voices of Canadians across the country could be integrated in an effort to better reflect the perceptions and assumptions held. Additionally, inclusion of more formats, like televised news,

⁴ Hayden V. White and Robert Doran, *The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory, 1957-2007* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010): 23.

and the emerging blog-sphere, would contribute to the inclusiveness of this research. Language barriers, as well as the scope of this project, have limited the narrative.

This thesis is organized into two chapters. Chapter one provides some necessary context through a brief history of the conflict in Israel-Palestine. It details the early Zionist movement and the Palestinian response to the creation of the state of Israel. The history of Palestinian movements is also explored. Chapter two analyses *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*'s coverage of Hamas during the initial unfolding of the Second Intifada. The second chapter begins with the end of Camp David peace talks in the summer of 2000 and, moving chronologically, charts media coverage until 9/11. In this chapter, I present primary source evidence to argue that *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* initially reveal a dominant frame that emphasizes individual suffering of Palestinians and Israelis, a frame I have called a "human rights" frame, before shifting into a period of oscillation between a "human rights" and a portrayal of the events of the Second Intifada as connected to a larger macro-frame which I have called the "terrorism" frame. As the events of the Second Intifada progress, the "terrorism" frame became increasingly dominant within both *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*. However, the predominance of the "terrorism" frame emerges earlier, and is more pronounced, in the *National Post*. The scope of this research project has prevented in depth discussion, a direct comparison of the ideological underpinnings of the two newspapers would be an obvious next step in the study of "terrorism" framing in Canadian media.

Significant research has been conducted on the effects of 9/11 on the news media, with the overwhelming majority finding an increase in the use of the terms "terrorism" and "terrorist"

to discuss events in Arab majority areas, and in discussions of individuals of Arab descent.⁵ Unsurprisingly, this research has focused primarily on the US media, but case studies on the media responses in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, are growing.⁶ Erin Stuetter and Deborah Wills have contributed a vast amount of literature describing the Canadian media's response to 9/11. In their book *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror*, Stuetter and Wills argue that the prevalence of dehumanizing metaphors that compare "terrorists" to animals or vermin increased in the post-9/11 period.⁷ This thesis does not intend to challenge the consensus that the Western media representation of Muslim peoples became increasingly negative after 9/11. Rather, I examine the prevalence of "terrorism" frames in the pre- 9/11 period to weigh the discrepancy and consistency in which such frames were applied. Additionally, this thesis draws on two areas of study, Canadian perceptions of the Israel-Palestine conflict and Canadian media's use of "terrorism" framing, that are rarely addressed together. In doing so, I hope to offer greater insight into the history of the "terrorism" frame in Canada.

As much of the focus of this research revolves around applications of the contentious term "terrorism", it is pertinent at the outset to unpack some of the debates surrounding the concept. Many definitions of terrorism exist and, while there are significant differences, there is

⁵ Michael Toome and Benedict E. Singleton, "The Post-9/11 "Terrorism" Discourse and Its Impact on Nonstate Actors: A Comparative Study of the LTTE and Hamas," *Asian Politics & Policy* 6, no. 2 (2014): 185.

⁶ Jurgen Gerhards and Mike S. Schafer, "International Terrorism, Domestic Coverage? How Terrorist Attacks are Presented in the News of CNN, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD," *International Communication Gazette* 76, no. 1, (2014): 5.

⁷ Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror* (Lexington Books, 2009), 12.

overlap. A.P. Schmid, a UN advisor, studied a variety of definitions, finding 22 similarities that he used to produce the following definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist, victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience[s]), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.⁸

This definition is useful for scholarly consideration as it attempts to include a diverse set of viewpoints. However, it is not the definition commonly used in media applications of “terrorism” discourse.⁹ In media, the term “terrorist” tends to be applied as a pejorative term to individuals seen as “other” or part of societal out-groups who engage in violent behaviours.¹⁰ Typically, minorities are disproportionately labeled as, or suspected of being “terrorists.” In short, the term “terrorism” is not used as an analytical category with clear criteria, but as part of larger narratives of enemy construction. Considerable academic focus has been dedicated to “terrorism” discourse and its effects. While these accounts sometimes differ in terms of their subject matter, it is widely agreed that the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist” are employed as pejorative terms used to actively dehumanize the subject, and are often coupled with other referential language to further denigrate the individuals or groups in question.¹¹ Using the term “terrorist” infers a value

⁸ Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature* (Amsterdam:North-Holland Pub. Co, 1983), 70.

⁹ Kimberly A. Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11,” *Communication Studies* 62, no. 1 (2011): 92.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 93.

¹¹ Cristina Archetti, *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 16.

judgment about the validity of the tactics, methods, objectives, and motives of the group or individual to whom the label is applied. For instance, the term can be used ideologically to discredit those who have been branded as “terrorists”, as terms such as “violence” and “terror” are highly politicized, generally embraced by the victim and spurned by the perpetrator.¹² Additionally, like any term, “terrorism” can be manipulated to suit specific political needs, and application of the term can be used to discredit oppositional groups and justify state policies.¹³ “Terrorism” also conjures shadow images of evil and villainy, and a web of highly organized members who relish in committing violent acts. It is typically seen as something “only the bad guys do”, with the further implication that it is never an act committed by a state actor.¹⁴ A further aspect of the discourse of “terrorism” is the implication that it embodies a specific set of values that a group ascribes to, rather than a tactic. The use of the suffix “-ism” also contributes to the perception that “terrorism” is an ideology. This creates a sense that “terrorism,” that is, the use of political violence, is an end in itself rather than a tool to achieve political aims and that a war can be waged legitimately against it.¹⁵

What is said to constitute “terrorism” in Canadian media and academic scholarship has been inconsistent. Rather than any clear-cut difference from similar politically motivated activities such as “extremism,” “insurgency,” or “guerrilla tactics,” the use of the term “terrorism” can be motivated by the emotional reaction triggered by the extent of the violence,

¹² Ibid, 17.

¹³ Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and John Martinkus, *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 32.

¹⁴ Ibid, 33.

¹⁵ Rane, Ewart and Martinkus, *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts*, 40.

the choice of targets, the unexpectedness of the action, or the radical nature of the actor's message.¹⁶ The blurred boundaries between "terror" and other similar actions have caused some scholars, such as Christina Archetti, to question the validity and usefulness of "terrorism" as an analytical category due to the unbounded nature of the term and the subjectiveness of the defining criteria.¹⁷ However, the wide use of the term as a category and narrative frame makes the term "terrorism" difficult to avoid. I do not wish to engage with attempts to define "terrorism" beyond acknowledgement of the implications behind the use of the term. Rather, my main intention is to analyze how and when the term was employed by Canadian media outlets to frame the activities of Hamas and other Palestinian groups active in the first several months of the Second Intifada.

Use of "terrorism" as a framing device within Canadian media also warrants discussion of what media frames are, how they are used by media, and how they can be identified and analyzed. Robert Entman states that frames identify and define problems, meaning they determine what an involved actor is doing, identify the forces creating the problem, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.¹⁸ By quickly highlighting and explaining problems, frames can quickly convey a message to audiences. Holli Semetko and Patti Valkenburg identify that media commonly use five different frames when reporting events: an attribution of responsibility frame, a conflict frame, a morality frame, an economic frame and a human-interest frame.¹⁹ For

¹⁶ Archetti, *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach*, 14.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁸ Robert M. Entman. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 52.

¹⁹ Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News," *Journal of Communication* 50, no. 2 (2000): 95.

example, a conflict frame emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest, while a morality frame places an event within the context of religious tenets or moral norms. Frames can also present information as “episodic”, meaning an event is treated as an isolated occurrence separate from larger social issues, or as “thematic”, meaning context and historical trends are included in the analysis.²⁰ Frames share many similarities to narrative, but frames differ from more general practices of storytelling because of their durability. Frames show persistence and consistence in how aspects of an event or type of event is highlighted or suppressed.²¹ This consistency has been shown to shape public perceptions of political issues, institutions or types of events. For example, Shanto Iyengar argues that television news has encouraged audiences to understand social problems, such as poverty, as the fault of an individual.²² Previous research by Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira on “terrorism” and media identify that the media thematic and episodic frames are applied, and that they both promote negative stereotypes.²³ Building on previous research on framing, Jesper Falkheimer and Eva-Karin Olson argue that the media often rely on macro-frames, such as the “Cold-War frame”, when covering international political conflicts. Macro frames often present local events as tied to larger international conflicts.²⁴ For example, a

²⁰ Ibid, 96.

²¹ Entman. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 51.

²² Shanto Iyengar, "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546, no. 1 (1996): 65.

²³ Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, "News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers," *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 13, no. 1 (2008): 58.

²⁴ Jesper Falkheimer and Eva-Karin Olsson, “Depoliticizing Terror: The News Framing of the Terrorist Attacks in Norway, 22 July 2011,” *Media, War & Conflict* 8, no. 1 (2015): 74.

domestic event in a country viewed to be a potential Cold-War enemy may have been portrayed as connected to or caused by larger Cold-War animosities. Following 9/11, scholars have argued for the dominance of a new macro-frame called the “war-on-terror” frame, or “terrorism” frame. Similar to the Cold-War frame, it links local conflicts with international ones.²⁵

The widespread use of the “terrorism” frame in mass media to refer to religiously motivated activities in the Middle East began in the 1970s and 1980s, but the assumptions that inform the “terrorism” frame predate its dominance. Additionally, the term “terrorism” was also much broader, and was used to refer to leftist and separatists movements across Europe. Much of what Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism critiques, and what Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” narrative argues for, have significantly influenced how mass media frames instances of “terror” in the Middle East. Edward Said describes how the perceptions of the ‘East’ as a cultural “other” was a representational construction that had roots in early colonial and pre-colonial thought, but had persisted into the modern era through repetition in various forms of media.²⁶ For example the Arab individual is viewed as essentially and exclusively fanatical, extremist, and violent, and the ‘Eastern’ woman as exotic, tempting and demure.²⁷ Repetition causes such discourses to be accepted as objective truth by audiences. Central to Said’s argument is that stereotypical archetypes, such as the image of the “exotic woman”, are concepts that are applied and created, and whether alluring or threatening, portray the referent as intrinsically less

²⁵ Ibid, 75.

²⁶ Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 8.

²⁷ Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror* (Lexington Books, 2009), 34.

advanced and explicitly ‘other’ to “Western” society.²⁸ A product of colonial systems of knowledge production in which the colonizers control the narrative of the colonized, Orientalist rhetoric has also been used to justify the act of colonization, subjugation or conquest through systemic and repeated dehumanization or ‘othering’ of the colonized.²⁹ While current media discourse does not explicitly advocate for physical colonization of the ‘East’, themes of conquest through military occupation and victory over the ‘barbaric terrorist’ have dominated headlines and other forms of media for decades.³⁰ Additionally, even when the ‘East’ is not represented as a threatening shadow awaiting a moment to destroy “Western” freedom, it is a place to be consumed. Exotic and fascinating like a fantasy land, the ‘East’ is enticing, but irreconcilable with a shared humanness.³¹ The distorting framework of Orientalism hides the far richer, varied, and complex plurality of experiences, in which the secular and religious, moderate and extreme, and progressive and conservative exist within the same discordant whole, just as all societies contain multitudes of ideologies, viewpoints, and contradictions.³² However, what Said emphasizes is that because the narrative representations of the ‘East’ are so remarkably consistent across multiple platforms, disciplines and over time, these portrayals create the impression that the representations of the ‘East’ are truth, rather than a constructed image.³³

²⁸ Ibid, 35.

²⁹ Ibid, 36.

³⁰ Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, 14.

³¹ Rane, Ewart and Martinkus, *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts*, 10.

³² Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, 27.

³³ Ibid, 28.

Said's theory has been highly influential as it offers an explanation of why and how the constructed image of the 'East' has become embedded in our media and culture.

The years following 9/11 saw a resurgence of interest in and a revitalized relevance of Said's critique of Orientalism. Overt and covert forms of Orientalism were central to America's response to 9/11, particularly the rhetoric and actions of the U.S. "war on terror."³⁴ Much of this "new" Orientalism present in the post-9/11 period was influenced by a "clash of civilizations" narrative. The theory of a "clash of civilizations" was popularized by Samuel Huntington, but the concept was originated by Bernard Lewis.³⁵

Lewis portrays the Middle East as the "other", opposite to "Western civilization", and reads the historic relations between the two to be a 1400-year rivalry.³⁶ By contrast, many historians depict a much richer and complex history with periods of conflict, but also cooperation and coexistence.³⁷ For Lewis, however, the "contemporary clash" began with the Turks' failed siege of Vienna in 1683.³⁸ He views this defeat as causing Muslim empires to lose dominance in the region; eventually the loss of territorial sovereignty spawned anti-Western sentiment and desires to "reassert Muslim greatness."³⁹ Lewis argued that the cause of anti-Western sentiment is imperialism, which he defines as "the invasion and domination of Muslim countries by non-

³⁴ Kenichi Yamaguchi, "Rationalization and Concealment of Violence in American Responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a State of Exception." *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 48, no. 3 (2012): 249.

³⁵ Rane, Ewart and Martinkus, *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts*, 136.

³⁶ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic*, 1990.

³⁷ Rane, Ewart and Martinkus, *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts*, 138.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 139.

³⁹ Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic*, 1990.

Muslims.”⁴⁰ This invasion and domination need not necessarily be in physical or military terms, as Lewis also claims that ideas can be a powerful form of domination and control. For example, Lewis states that ideas such as secularism undermine the place of Islam in the social order, thus causing social disruption.

While Lewis originated the concept of the “clash”, the theory is most closely associated with Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington, continued conflict between Islam and the West is inevitable because of irreconcilable differences. Huntington presents the two “civilizations” of Islam and the West as defined by their respective cultural ideals, but more importantly, religious identities, stating that the “fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”⁴¹ The “clash of civilizations” theory has been criticized for being overly reductive, yet many tenets of Huntington’s thesis have become integrated into the “terrorism” frame employed by media.

Huntington begins his definition of “civilizations” in an extensive discussion of the philosophical origins of the concept by examining the works of thinkers from a variety of disciplines, such as social scientists Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Pitirim Sorokin, Immanuel Wallerstein, as well as historians such as Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee.⁴² Despite the varied methodology, focus and concepts used in discussions of what a civilization is, Huntington asserts that “broad agreement” exists on “central propositions concerning the nature, identity, and

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 128.

⁴² Jack F. Matlock Jr., “Can Civilizations Clash?” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 143, no. 3 (1999): 430.

dynamics of civilization.”⁴³ For Huntington, a civilization is primarily a cultural entity and is comprehensive, but he does acknowledge that there may be some blurring of boundaries between civilizations.⁴⁴ Huntington states that the principal characteristics of civilization include language, history, religion, customs, institutions and the self identification of people. However, religion is the key defining factor in Huntington’s categorization. In contradiction to Huntington’s assertion that there exists a “broad consensus” of what a civilization is, there has historically been little agreement on how to define civilizations. For example, Jack F. Matlock Jr. notes that Oswald Spengler excludes the material side of life from his definition, while Kroeber, Bagby, and Braudel insist that culture and civilization encompass all aspects of life, including the economic and material.⁴⁵ Even Huntington’s definition of civilization is internally inconsistent. Matlock Jr. argues that Huntington’s concept of “civilizations” does not exist in the literal sense and thus should not be used as a basis for policy. However, the perception of a “clash” between the Judaeo-Christian ‘West’ and the Muslim ‘East’ has become a central aspect of the “terrorism” frame as our media began to increasingly portray Arab peoples as a homogenous civilization diametrically opposed to the ‘West.’ Given the plethora of incorrect or prejudiced assumptions held about many Arab nations, a condensed examination of the history of Israel-Palestine is warranted to establish a basic understanding of the events and historical trends that have influenced the trajectory of the conflict.

⁴³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 128.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 129.

⁴⁵ Matlock Jr., “Can Civilizations Clash?” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 143, no. 3 (1999): 431.

Chapter One: A Brief History of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

The political crystallization of the Zionist movement was sparked by the 1896 publication of Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State*. Written in response to rising anti-semitism across Europe it advocated for the transformation of a religious community into a nation requiring a territorial home. Twenty years later, Great Britain issued the 1917 Balfour Declaration, promising to facilitate a 'national homeland' for the Jewish peoples.⁴⁶ The Zionist communities in Palestine grew significantly, with hundreds of thousands of Jews living across Palestine by World War II. Such settlements were initially protected by the British, who allowed Jewish immigration and the purchase of land, against the wishes of the overwhelming Arab majority. Relatively well organized, the growing Jewish community created multiple governmental bodies and began to form the loose structures of statehood.⁴⁷

The Palestinian national movement that developed in resistance to Zionist settlement modelled other nationalist or anti-colonial movements. In the course of the struggle, a Palestinian identity built around territorial claims and national resistance began to develop.⁴⁸ By 1918, the first cross-denominational associations to protest colonial occupation were created. Simultaneously, a religious movement had developed in parallel. The division between the more secular nationalist movement, and the religious opposition hampered progress as it limited

⁴⁶ Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 599.

⁴⁷ Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 600.

⁴⁸ Glenn E. Robinson, "The Palestinians," in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* ed. Mark Garirowski, David E. Long, and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2014), 345.

coordination.⁴⁹ However, despite factionalism between the two major branches of resistance, considerable progress was made in the 1920s. An ideology had emerged that proclaimed an Arab right to Palestine, and Islamic symbols of resistance were mobilized in resistance to the advances of Zionism.⁵⁰ The 1930s witnessed the birth of a mass movement against occupation. Despite the use of Islam as a tool of resistance, the ‘Arab consciousness’ that emerged was relatively inclusive of all Arab peoples inhabiting Palestine, and thus encompassed Christians who came to view themselves as part of the Palestinian Arab populace.⁵¹ Lacking in modern nationalist narratives and myths used by Western nation states to garner widespread appeal, and up against strong kinship and clan ties that divided the burgeoning Palestinian nation, Islamic symbols helped to mobilize the population in a unified struggle.⁵² The Palestinian Islamist movement had ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and as such was influenced ideologically by the specific branch of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism preached by the group.⁵³ The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-Banna and a small group of his associates in March 1928 in Isma’ilyya, Egypt. The goal of this organization, which would later become one of the largest political parties in Egypt and inspire splinter organizations in other neighbouring countries, was to build an “Islamic society” through the application of Islamic, or *Shari’a*, law as a response to

⁴⁹ Robinson, “The Palestinians,” 346.

⁵⁰ Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 601.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Robinson, “The Palestinians,” 346.

⁵³ Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (United States of America: Indiana University Press, 1994), 3.

what was viewed as the decline and subjugation of Islamic societies following the rise of European modalities of governance and thought.⁵⁴

The Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with Palestine began in 1935. During the Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood carried out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians, and publicized the conflict among Egyptian students, thus raising the profile of the Palestinian cause among the greater Arab world.⁵⁵ But the revolts and attacks against governmental institutions and Jewish settlements launched by Palestinian resistors were suppressed by the British administration, eventually leading to imposition of military administration and the banning of Islamic bodies such as the the Supreme Muslim Council.⁵⁶

From the late 1930s, British attitudes towards Palestine shifted, hoping to win over Arab support for the impending war with Germany. So, the 1939 White Paper restricted Zionist immigration and land purchases.⁵⁷ Following the horrors of the Holocaust, however, mounting pressures to allow unrestricted immigration of Jewish refugees from the international community caused Britain to eventually surrender control of mandatory Palestine to the newly created United Nations, which proposed partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish, one Palestinian-Arab, in 1947.⁵⁸ The war that followed resulted in the destruction of hundreds of

⁵⁴ Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 5.

⁵⁶ Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 601.

⁵⁷ Michael Stanislawski, *Zionism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 55.

⁵⁸ William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2013), 241.

Palestinian villages and caused hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to flee their homes to nearby countries seeking refuge. Called the *nakba*, or ‘catastrophe’, by Palestinians, thousands of Palestinians were placed in refugee camps, many of which still remain.⁵⁹

In the post-war period, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to be active within Palestinian society and remained involved with Islamic opposition movements.⁶⁰ But due to the divided territory and variant governing bodies, the development of Islamic resistance differed between the West Bank, which prior to 1967 was annexed by Jordan, and Gaza, which was under Egyptian control. During this period, opposition to Israel was primarily driven by nearby nations, with Cairo, Amman, and Damascus acting as the centres of the state-led resistance movement.⁶¹ However, the 1967 war marked a crushing defeat for the Arab nations, thrusting the growing, but divided, Palestinian resistance movement into a new leadership role.⁶²

In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab defeat several small guerrilla organizations were active in the Gaza Strip and Jordan. Al-Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, emerged as the most successful independent commando organization.⁶³ By 1969, Arafat was elected as chairman of the executive committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO was an umbrella coalition of resistance groups, rather than a single unified front. Al-Fatah’s ideology was based on Palestinian nationalism, and avoided close association with doctrines of communism, Baathism,

⁵⁹ Ibid, 250.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 250.

⁶¹ Robinson, “The Palestinians,” 347.

⁶² Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 251.

⁶³ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 196.

or Pan-Arabism.⁶⁴ Al-Fatah also affirmed the necessity of armed resistance. The militancy of the PLO ostracized some of the Palestinian cause's allies. States such as Jordan, saw the Palestinian activists as a threat to existing Arab regimes, and Arab leaders were hesitant to offer sanctuary to the organization.⁶⁵ However, despite challenges the PLO helped to build a concept of Palestinian identity.⁶⁶

The main response to the PLO's use of armed violence and the organization's growing international profile was increased suppression of opposition activities by Israel, as well as other states. For example, in 1970 Jordanian troops, backed by the United States, crushed the PLO in Amman and other cities. Offensives against Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon by the Lebanese army also occurred.⁶⁷ The first of these attacks was launched in 1973, and following multiple subsequent incursions, concluded with major invasions of Lebanon by the Israeli army in 1978 and 1982.⁶⁸ During this period, Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory also increased. In 1977, Likud, a centre-right political alliance led by Menachem Begin, was elected. Begin's electoral victory coincided with the rise of a religious settlers' movement. Publicly committed to the annexations of the territories occupied in 1967, the central pillar of Begin's strategy was the establishment of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza.⁶⁹ This settlement policy was designed to break-up predominantly Arab areas with the intention of limiting the

⁶⁴ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 335.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 336.

⁶⁶ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, 200.

⁶⁷ Rashid Khalidi, "Historical Landmarks in the Hundred Years' War on Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 47, no. 1 (2017): 11.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 12.

⁶⁹ Amir Goldstein, "Half-heartedly: Menachem Begin and the Establishment of the Likud Party," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 6, (2017): 919.

emergence of a collective Palestinian identity.⁷⁰ Repressive government policy towards Palestinians in the occupied territories, such as imprisonment, deportation and house arrest, were compounded by aggressive actions by some settlers. The PLO remained the primary representative and advocate for the Palestinian people, and Arafat maintained widespread support.

However, under the pressure of increasing Israeli settlement and repression, questions around the secular PLO as an effective agent of resistance began to grow. Amidst mounting tension and frustration towards the lack of tangible change, and the larger wave of Islamic resistance building in nearby nations, Hamas emerged as an Islamic alternative to the PLO.⁷¹ On December 9, 1987 an Israeli military vehicle collided with a civilian car, killing four Palestinians and injuring others. In the wake of the accident, a protest movement arose, consisting of civil disobedience led by the Unified National Leadership.⁷² The Unified National Leadership (UNL) initially contained members from the major factions of the PLO, but coalesced into a distinct movement. As the movement gained momentum, and the rising number of stabbings and shootings gained greater media recognition, challengers to the UNL's dominance sprang up. Among them was the Islamic Resistance Movement, more commonly known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas. Defining itself through Islamic terms, the Intifada launched Hamas onto the world stage as a significant player and a viable alternative to the PLO.⁷³ Offering an alternative

⁷⁰ Ibid, 920.

⁷¹ Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 16.

⁷² Ibid, 21.

⁷³ Ibid, 37.

to the strategy of compromise advocated for by their opponents, Hamas reinvigorated Islamic resistance against Israel. Hamas organized welfare agencies, agricultural relief societies and the apparatus of an increasingly organized, integrated Palestinian society and became a key leader of the first Intifada.⁷⁴ Additionally, Hamas promised action. In the face of stalling negotiations and increasingly aggressive settlement policies, many were drawn to the promise of progress.⁷⁵

The first Intifada was launched by the initiative of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, rather than the PLO leadership based in Tunis. The creation of a grass-roots protest movement signalled a weakening of the PLO within Palestinian politics, which was now being shaped by local Palestinians, and especially Hamas.⁷⁶ The PLO lost further support after entering into negotiations with the US in 1988. In 1988 the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the governing body of the PLO, formally adopted UN Resolutions 181, 242, and 338, among others, recognizing Israel's existence within the pre-1967 boundaries.⁷⁷ The PNC had also called for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war, and the creation of a formal Palestinian state.⁷⁸ The PLO's recognition of Israel created divisions within the Palestinian national movement. Islamic Jihad, an Islamist organization, and Hamas both repudiated the PLO's actions. Following 1988, the differences between the political factions in Palestine became more pronounced. Support, or lack thereof, for the two-state solution divided the

⁷⁴ Azzam Tamimi, *Hamas: A History from Within* (Northampton, Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2007), 14.

⁷⁵ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, 203.

⁷⁶ Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 167.

⁷⁷ Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, 168.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

political landscape.⁷⁹ Hamas remained staunchly opposed to the negotiations with Israel, issuing a leaflet in 1989 that reaffirmed the groups rejection of “all political initiatives to resolve the Palestinian problem.”⁸⁰ Additionally, Hamas rejected invitations to later meetings of the PNC, further separating themselves from the nationalist sector of the Palestinian resistance. The PLO’s support of the 1991 Madrid conference further deepened the political cleavages, and enhanced Hamas’ position as a real alternative to Fatah.⁸¹ Hamas’ influence among Palestinians rose for several reasons. First, critics and proponents of Hamas alike acknowledged the groups ability to enforce its agenda during the Intifada, indicating significant organizational capacity. Second, Hamas had become the new political leader for large sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, and students who had supported Islamist blocs in the University elections that occurred prior to the Intifada. Third, and finally, it was assumed that as the Intifada continued without tangible diplomatic breakthroughs, support for the PLO’s strategy of compromise would wane. Hamas would be the major beneficiary of such polarization.⁸²

The polarization of the Palestinian opposition continued and intensified in the years proceeding, and following, the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords, formally known as the Declaration of Principals, between Israel and the PLO set out a framework for resolution of the entrenched conflict.⁸³ In outlining principles that were to govern relations between the PLO and Israel for a five year interim period, Oslo offered hope for a negotiated peace. However, the

⁷⁹ Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, 170.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 171.

⁸¹ Ibid, 172.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Shamir Hassan, “Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine,” *Social Scientist* 39, no. 7/8 (2011): 67.

accords were plagued by problems and delays, taking two years to be initially concluded. The Oslo Accords shaped the future of Palestinian state building, but also highlighted the shortcomings of the formal peace process and further divided the Palestinian opposition. Many saw the PLO and Fatah's support of the Oslo Accords as a betrayal of Palestinian interests.⁸⁴ Hamas had been gaining support in within the occupied territories, and threatened to displace Fatah as the primary political power. Fatah's subsequent support of the Oslo peace process cemented Hamas' status as the leading agent of resistance to Israel for a growing number of Palestinians.

Additionally, political candidates linked to Hamas saw significant electoral success, sweeping a number of chamber of commerce elections. In student body elections at Palestinian universities, Hamas also won a number of seats.⁸⁵ This is not to say that Fatah and the PLO had become irrelevant. Rather, the perception that the PLO and Fatah had failed to secure tangible progress for Palestine through diplomacy had led to growing dissatisfaction with the Palestinian leadership. This dissatisfaction manifested in increased support for Hamas. This was especially so following the PLO and Fatah's support for Oslo. With Fatah relinquishing its role as the primary opposition to Israel, Hamas became the political home for disenfranchised members of the Islamist resistance.⁸⁶

However, Hamas' growth following the Oslo Accords was not solely attributed to the failures of their opponents. Hamas attempted to create public space in which they could operate

⁸⁴ Hassan, "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine," *Social Scientist* 39, no. 7/8 (2011): 68.

⁸⁵ Sara Roy, "Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Examining Hamas and the Possibility of Reform." *Chicago Journal of International Law* 5, no. 1 (2004): 259.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 260.

and provide public services, such as education and health care, through well-developed infrastructure.⁸⁷ In this way, the Islamists maintained their presence and influence within Palestinian society and gained increased support and legitimacy. The interconnection between political and social action in Hamas' ideology meant that the expansion of the social sector also served the movement's objectives. Hence, Hamas' perusal of public sector services was practical and pragmatic.⁸⁸ Despite significant gains, the Islamist alternative remained unacceptable most Palestinians prior to the Second Intifada. However, it was clear that Hamas had become a fixture of the Palestinian political landscape. The relative calm of the Oslo period came to an end with the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the Islamist opposition gained increasing influence and support. Rising support for the Islamist resistance was caused in part by the economic and social decline in the occupied territories, but also by the lack of a viable secular alternative brought on by the failed Oslo peace process, and the decline of Fatah and the PLO. Because of the political vacuum that subsequently emerged, and the absence of meaningful non-violent options, Hamas and other Islamist movements became the dominant force against Israel in the Second Intifada.

⁸⁷ Roy, "Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Examining Hamas and the Possibility of Reform." *Chicago Journal of International Law* 5, no. 1 (2004): 262.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 269.

Chapter Two: **Media Analysis September 2000-September 2001**

Before beginning the analysis of Canadian media coverage between September 2000 and September 2001, clear definitions of the terms used must be reviewed. As previously noted, the “terrorism” frame is a macro-frame. Macro-frames, like the “Cold-War” frame that was frequently used to describe the protracted conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, often present local events as tied solely to larger international conflicts.⁸⁹ In the “terrorism” frame, this manifests as portraying an event that is domestic in nature, as part of a larger network, or a coalition of “terrorists” that is diametrically opposed to Western values. When the focus of a news story is on situating an event on macro-scale, domestic repercussions, or rescue missions are of lesser importance than potential foreign policy relations or military implications.⁹⁰ In the media discussion of the specific event, focus is primarily on the perpetrator of the violent act, rather than the victim. Potential affiliation with known terrorist organizations or motivations driving the violent act is emphasized, again linking a specific event to the larger macro context.⁹¹ Additionally, application of the “terrorism” frame is often coupled with warlike vocabulary. Unlike the “Cold-War” frame which could link events to the Soviet Union, a demarcated federation of states, the “terrorism” frame does not have an easily definable geographical “other” to pinpoint. As such, the “terrorism” frame frequently utilizes the rhetoric

⁸⁹ Jurgen Gerhards and Mike S. Schafer, “International Terrorism, Domestic Coverage? How Terrorist Attacks are Presented in the News of CNN, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD,” *International Communication Gazette* 76, no. 1, (2014): 13

⁹⁰ Ibid, 14.

⁹¹ Ibid, 15.

present in the “clash of civilizations” narrative presented by Huntington, and links specific events to a larger image of the “Muslim war against the West.”⁹²

In contrast, the “human rights” frame presents violent acts as criminal acts in similar fashion to domestic or local crime and focuses primarily on the suffering of the victim or victims.⁹³ Unlike the “terrorism” frame, the “human rights” frame does not engage in macro-framing, meaning that violent attacks are not portrayed as connected to any larger transnational terrorist organization. Rather, an event is framed similarly to domestic crime. Attackers are portrayed as deviant individuals who have violated social norms, rather than members of an enemy faction.⁹⁴ It is also often emphasized that these deviant individuals are not representative of their ethnic or religious background. Discussion of the political motives of the perpetrators is also less frequent.⁹⁵

This chapter analyzes the frames used by *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* to describe Hamas and the early months of the Second Intifada. The publications analyzed were chosen because they were English language mass media outlets with national distribution. As part of the Canadian mass media, *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* helped to set the agenda, meaning they dictated what events would be discussed during the new cycle, for other

⁹² Gerhards and Schafer, “International Terrorism, Domestic Coverage? How Terrorist Attacks are Presented in the News of CNN, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD,” *International Communication Gazette* 76, no. 1, (2014): 15.

⁹³ Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 13, no. 1 (2008): 58.

⁹⁴ Gerhards and Schafer, “International Terrorism, Domestic Coverage? How Terrorist Attacks are Presented in the News of CNN, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD,” *International Communication Gazette* 76, no. 1, (2014): 15.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 16.

media outlets. Thus by focusing primarily on mass media outlets, the narratives analyzed are more representative of the wider discourses present throughout the media. Again, the narratives and frames employed by *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* are not a proxy for Canadian public opinion, nor are they entirely representative of the broader media ecosystem. As detailed in the bibliography, this research draws on a close reading of over one hundred articles, dating from September 2000, to September 2001. Articles were retrieved from Proquest Historical Newspaper database and LexisNexus using the keywords “ Hamas ” and “ Second Intifada . ” Approximately 200 articles were initially retrieved for each publication. Approximately one hundred articles that were most representative, meaning they had substantial discussion of the chosen key words, were then selected for close analysis. I then coded each article using a “ human rights ” or a “ terrorism ” frame based on the criteria listed above, with emphasis placed on the presence, or lack there of, of the macro-framing that is central to the “ terrorism ” frame. The coding of each article analyzed is compiled in an appendix at the end of this thesis.

Beginning with the dissolution of the Camp David peace negotiations in the summer of 2000, this chapter argues that articles in *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* initially reveals a preference for a “ human rights ” frame, before entering a period of oscillation between a “ human rights ” frame, and a “ terrorism frame ”, and finally revealing the dominance of a “ terrorism ” frame. First, the media response to the failing peace process is discussed and finds that a “ human rights ” frame was most frequently applied. This period begins in late July 2000, following the breakdown of the Camp David II negotiations and begins to shift into oscillation by mid-October of 2000 following the outbreak of the Second Intifada and active violence. Between July and October 2000, *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* focus primarily on

the continued individual suffering that would be prolonged by the lack of a mutually supported peace agreement, and largely refrains from using a “terrorism” frame. Discussion of Hamas and their rejection of the peace process is not framed as connected to a larger spectre of “terror”, but rather as a reaction to a domestic issue. From mid-October 2000 to December 2000 it is found that “human rights” framing and “terrorism” framing are applied in an oscillating fashion as the Second Intifada began in earnest. In October 2000 the coverage of the violence in the *Globe and Mail* and *The National Post* was centred around the victims, both Palestinian and Israeli. As the conflict continued and escalated, “terrorism” framing was increasingly used to depict the actions of Hamas and the Palestinian opposition, but was not yet dominant. Third, from January 2001 to early September 2001, *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* began to focus increasingly on how the Canadian government should respond to the bombings and violence in Israel-Palestine. International developments, such as United Nations resolutions, and declarations of support or opposition by other countries, had created pressure on the Canadian government to make a statement. In this period both frames were applied, however, the “terrorism” frame was becoming increasingly dominant, and the “human rights” frame became a counter frame. This trajectory applies broadly to both newspapers. However, the move towards the dominance of the “terrorism” frame is both earlier, and more pronounced in the *National Post*, than in *The Globe and Mail*. Consideration of editorials or “letters to the editor” have been excluded in this analysis.

Disintegrating Peace Talks

The 1999 election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak signalled a renewed Israeli commitment to the peace process, and a rejection of the previous Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's divisive tactics. However, the Israeli public remained deeply divided on domestic issues, such as the role of religion within the legal system, as well the peace process. In July 2000, Barak entered into negotiations with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority in a two-week peace summit, known as Camp David II, led by U.S. President Bill Clinton.⁹⁶ Despite initial hope that a compromise could be reached, the negotiations ended, once again in an impasse. Issues such as sovereignty over East Jerusalem, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees remained divisive, and caused growing problems for both Arafat and Barak within their respective domestic electorates.⁹⁷

As Camp David II came to a close in late July 2000 without any formal agreements, the Canadian media began to speculate on the cause behind the stalemate, and what the implications of yet another failed attempt at securing a peace negotiation would mean. As Autumn began, rising tensions and disillusionment among Palestinians over failure of the Oslo peace process revealed once again at the recent Camp David II summit, erupted with violence.⁹⁸

From late July 2000 to mid-October 2000 the topic of discussion within the Canadian media was why Barak and Arafat were unable to find a compromise. The "human rights" frame

⁹⁶ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 467.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ For example, Larry Kaplow, "Both Sides Fear Violent Outcome," *National Post*, Jul 26, 2000. Laura King, "Statehood Inevitable by Year End, PLO Says," *The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)*, Jul 04, 2000. "Peace Deferred." *National Post*, Jul 26, 2000. Paul Taylor, "Palestinians, Israelis may Fight Out Next Round in the Streets: Countdown to Deadline Bound to Raise Tension," *National Post*, Jul 26, 2000.

was predominant, as the negative implications of the failed peace process were not framed on a macro-level, but rather as a domestic issue with potentially harmful implications for both populations. Articles noted that the unwillingness to compromise demonstrated by both sides was not caused by a fundamental difference between “warring civilizations” or dogmatic ideals, so much as it was driven rational cost-benefit analysis.⁹⁹ Additionally, the importance placed on analyzing Palestinian demands as policies that can be affected and motivated by domestic concerns, rather than simply denouncing the demands as “radical” or “irrational”, is emphasized and there are few attempts to locate the events outside of a domestic context.¹⁰⁰ In more than one instance, Israeli Prime Minister Barak’s faltering electoral coalition is cited as the primary cause of the failed negotiations. Barak is also accused by both newspapers of making critical errors in the negotiation process.¹⁰¹ With Barak criticized as being inconsistent, *The Globe and Mail*, argues that Arafat’s desires to push for similar concessions to those Barak had offered previously was rational.¹⁰²

Additionally, Hamas, who had openly criticized the peace negotiations, was not commonly portrayed as representative of the Palestinian opposition as a whole. Two generalizations can be noted. First, the dismay of the Palestinians is referenced, but often in conjunction with, or even in the same sentence, as the disappointment of sectors of the Israeli

⁹⁹ For example, "It's No Ordinary Intifada." *The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)*, Oct 05, 2000.

¹⁰⁰ For example, Rose, A, “Barak's flawed formula,” *National Post*, October 9, 2000. “A New Lesson in Palestinian Schools: Israel Now Exists,” *The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)*, Sep 01, 2000.

¹⁰¹ For example, "Eight Killed as Palestinians Mark Statehood Claim: Violence Worsens: Israel Threatens to Abandon 'Policy of Restraint'." *National Post*, Nov 16, 2000.

¹⁰² For example, “One-sided process,” *National Post*, July 6, 2001.

populace.¹⁰³ Palestinian disappointment is also framed as a legitimate reaction to a situation with few positives. Secondly, references to Hamas rarely placed motivation on a potential “clash of civilization” or link the group to any wider narratives of “terror.” Rather, Hamas was most often portrayed as an exception, not as representative of the Muslim Palestinian experience.¹⁰⁴ Finally, the failure to reach an acceptable peace agreement is primarily framed as a political failure between two governments, rather than between two disparate “civilizations” in conflict. As mentioned earlier, criticism of both leaders was focused on their policy, and the perceived failures to maneuver politically.

The “terrorism” frame, was present in discussions of the failing negotiations, but as a counter frame, rather than the dominant frame. The “terrorism frame” was most seen, for example, in relation to discussions of the “fitness for statehood” of the Palestinians. Palestine was framed as an example of a population unready for or undeserving of independence. Listing factors such as poor economic stability, inability to attract outside investment, lack of monopoly over use of force, and weak and corrupt state institutions, articles framed Palestine's failures to be “ready for statehood” as caused by a cultural backwardness, and an affinity or predisposition for violence and disorder. Such rhetoric fits within the “terrorism” frame for three reasons. First, the violence and extremism of a minority is portrayed as representative of a larger whole.¹⁰⁵ In this instance, violence perpetrated by Hamas is painted as representative of the Palestinian

¹⁰³ For example, James, R, “Palestinians' logic behind the violence,” *The Globe and Mail*, November 16, 2000.

¹⁰⁴ For example, Kalman, M, “Violence feared after failure of summit talks,” *The Globe and Mail*, July 26, 2000. Norman Doidge, “The Palestinians' Little Bombers: School Textbooks Teach Children to Admire the Martyr,” *National Post*, Nov 09, 2000.

¹⁰⁵ For example, Neill Lochery, “Palestinians aren't ready for statehood,” *National Post*, September 12, 2000. Daniel Pipes, “Learning from Failure,” *National Post*, Jul 26, 2000.

opposition as a whole. Second, irreconcilable differences with, or fundamental hatred of, the ‘West’ is cited as the motivation or cause of the violence, rather than an examination of the domestic and historical factors that could have motivated the behaviour.¹⁰⁶

The Second Intifada Begins

Palestinian frustration towards the increasing network of Israeli settlements and military checkpoints, combined with the disappointment with the lack of progress made via formal negotiation channels erupted in late September 2000. Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud party, visited the Haram al-Sharif, also known as the Temple Mount, in Jerusalem. With the intent of demonstrating the right of any Jew to visit holy sites, Sharron’s visit was seen by many Palestinians as an affront to Islam.¹⁰⁷ Protests broke out, and what began as series of localized demonstrations morphed into a popular uprising. Israel responded with harsh repression, with eighteen Palestinians killed within the first two days of the protests. As the movement, which came to be known as the Second Intifada, continued it became increasingly clear that the hope for renewed peace negotiation was dwindling.¹⁰⁸

Beginning in mid-October 2000 the “human rights” frame and the “terrorism” frame were applied with comparable frequency. However, as the violence from all sides of the conflict continued, the frequency in which the “terrorism” frame was identifiable increased. But it was not clear which frame was dominant at the time. Instead, the media coverage of the Second Intifada between mid-October and December 2000 oscillated between the two frames. Media

¹⁰⁶ For example, Lochery, N, “On the edge of the abyss (again).” *National Post*.

¹⁰⁷ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 478.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 480.

coverage in both *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* focused on the victims of violence, rather than the attackers. Those injured are referred to as “youth” or as “unarmed,” portraying the victims as either unjust targets of violence, or as collateral victims and offered greater depth into the effects on the daily lives of the victims. Instances of Palestinian armed resistance were frequently called “uprisings” or simply “crowds” as opposed to the harsher “revolts” or “riots.”¹⁰⁹ Terms such as “riot” or “revolt” implies certain kinds of chaotic or aggressive behaviour, while “uprising” or “crowd” are more ambiguous references to the nature of the demonstration. When there is not verifiable evidence to indicate the motive of the protestors, there is little to no speculation of the motives of the protesters. When motivation is discussed, it is referenced in relation to the local issues driving the demonstrations, rather than as part of a global war between “civilizations.”¹¹⁰

However, the focus on the hardships and trauma experienced by the Palestinian peoples was contrasted with increasingly frequent applications of the “terrorism” frame. Hamas and those involved in active revolt were framed as fanatical, beyond rationality, or as driven by a “suicidal passion.”¹¹¹ Consistent with the “terrorism” frame, such rhetoric connects a local issue to an imagined “clash of civilizations” in which the Palestinian opposition is part of a larger affront to Western values and culture. The local context, such as the increasing rate of Israeli settlement or the failure of the PA to secure tangible progress for Palestine, are ignored in favour

¹⁰⁹ For example, “Mideast Teeters on Brink.” *The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)*, Oct 13, 2000. Skater Abu El Uon, “Palestinians, Israelis Talking,” *The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)*, Nov 24, 2000.

¹¹⁰ For example, Isabel Vincent, “‘we are on a Collision Course’: Israel: Arafat Unrelenting: Barak to Form an Emergency Government with Hawk Ariel Sharon,” *National Post*, Oct 13, 2000. Alexander Rose, “Barak's Flawed Formula,” *National Post*, Oct 09, 2000.

¹¹¹ For example, Peter Goodspeed, “Israel Launches Retaliatory Attacks: Gunships Respond to Killing of Schoolboys: Hamas Releases Suicide Bomber's Farewell Tape: 'I Am the 12th of the Martyrs’” *National Post*, Mar 29, 2001.

of ascribing the Second Intifada to widespread hate throughout the Palestinian population. There was also an increasing shift in the portrayal of victims. Rather than utilizing a “human rights” frame, which emphasizes the suffering of the victim, women and children were sometimes framed as part of a “larger network of terror” with aims to destroy Israel. School children were cited as blindly idolizing suicide bombers, and being taught to make incendiary devices in class.¹¹² This kind of narrative portrays Palestinian support of “terrorism” as a widespread and pervasive phenomena, thus rejecting the image of limited extremism that is central to the “human rights” frame.

Whose Ally?

The aftermath of UN resolution 1322 on September 28, 2000, in which Ariel Sharon’s provocative excursion to the Temple Mount was condemned, and condolences were issued to those killed or injured by Israeli riot police, provoked responses from media. Canada had voted in favour of resolution 1322, while the U.S. had opposed, but not vetoed the motion.¹¹³ The decision made by the Canadian government was met with media criticism. However the media discussions of the Canadian government’s position on the ongoing conflict in Israel-Palestine remained relatively quiet until early December 2000. Discussions on whether Canada should associate with, or support, groups such as Hamas appeared frequently, and predominantly used a “terrorism” frame.

¹¹² For example, Norman Doidge, "The Palestinians' Little Bombers: School Textbooks Teach Children to Admire the Martyr," *National Post*, Nov 09, 2000.

¹¹³ For example, John Ibittson, “UN resolution comes back to haunt Liberals,” *The Globe and Mail*, November 4, 2000.

Reports of domestic protest, such as pro-Hamas demonstrators burning Israeli flags in Ottawa, and the implications of Canada's stance on the upcoming federal election became topics of interest.¹¹⁴ Reports also analyzed the lack of anti-terrorism funding legislation in Canada, discussing a number of cases in which immigrants, primarily of Middle Eastern descent, were found to be funnelling profits from criminal activities to Hamas, and other groups like Hezbollah which operate social services branches in addition to armed wings.¹¹⁵ The accused claim the money was for "widows and children", but authorities were unable to ascertain the final use for the funds.¹¹⁶ Such debates highlight a key aspect that complicates the discourse surrounding Hamas; they are a group whose foundational charter is overtly racist, yet they are also a significant provider of social services to Palestinians who may have few alternatives.¹¹⁷ While some discourse did attempt to dissect exactly where Hamas falls on the dividing line between receiving sympathy for charitable acts or condemnation for violent retaliation, media coverage predominantly used a "terrorism" frame. Speculation on the presence of complex terrorist networks permeating Canada's immigrant populations appeared with increasingly frequency as the conflict continued.¹¹⁸ By portraying immigrants as potentially harbouring extremist sympathies, the media cast suspicion on all immigrants and engaged in macro-framing typical of

¹¹⁴ For example, Joel-Denis Bellavance and Stewart Bell, "Canada Soft on Terrorism, Alliance MP Charges: Jewish Congress Urges Ottawa to Step Up the Fight," *National Post*, Feb 23, 2001.

¹¹⁵ For example, Bell, "Hezbollah Raising Funds in Canada: Mideast Academic: RCMP Says Donors Believe Money Going to Social Services," *National Post*, Dec 04, 2000.

¹¹⁶ For example, Bell, "Cyber-Attacks Threaten Canada: CSIS: Terrorism Goes Online: Rogue Nations using Computers as Weapons: Sources," *National Post*, Jul 18, 2001.

¹¹⁷ For example, Bell, "Canada Grows as a Target for Terrorists: CSIS: Peacekeeping Role and Acceptance of Migrants Increase Threat of Attack," *National Post*, Jun 13, 2001.

¹¹⁸ For example, Bell, "Anti-Terrorism Law Faces Legal Hurdle: Bill C-16: Muslims Want Act Reviewed by Supreme Court," *National Post*, May 03, 2001.

the “terrorism” frame. Clearly, the initial oscillation between a “terrorism” and “human rights” frame that was present in the early months of the Second Intifada had shifted, and a “terrorism” frame had become increasingly dominant. The “human rights” frame persisted, but as a counter frame rather than the dominant narrative.

Conclusion

The Canadian media's struggle to define Hamas and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is centred around the challenge of moralizing a set of actors who can all be painted as culpable for perpetuating violence as well as stalling the peace process, and built upon existing orientalist rhetoric. This thesis' research has concluded that the *National Post* and *The Globe and Mail* oscillated between a "human rights" frame, and a "terrorism" frame, and as the Second Intifada continued, the "terrorism" frame became increasingly dominate as the Second Intifada progressed.

Like other resistance movements that employ violence to achieve political aims, Hamas forces consideration of the criteria for labelling what is legitimate use of force by non-state actors to challenge the on-going denial of their own civil, political and human rights. Representational imagery of challengers to entrenched power structures, such as a colonial occupation or unjust government, has varied widely across place and time, with some groups deemed as deserving of sympathy and support, and others condemned. While racial and religious frames have dominated how this conflict is portrayed, the nature of the Israeli-Palestine conflict and the resistance movements that have emerged, is at its core, a struggle for territory, self-governance and sovereignty—themes deeply familiar to Canadian audiences as they have defined and divided our own historical narrative.

The "terrorism" frame that emerged in Canada and became dominant by December 2000 supports the "clash of civilizations" narrative, in that it portrays "terrorism" as a monolithic entity. Additionally, the "terrorism" frame is often Orientalist, describing Arab nations and individuals as backwards and barbaric. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the Canadian

media had also engaged in other forms of framing that were less pejorative, such as the “human rights” frame that was previously predominant. Regardless, this analysis has concluded that the broad generalizations made in the “terrorism” have helped to create and perpetuate a tradition of dehumanizing and ‘othering’ Arab and Islamic peoples in the Canadian media. For the Canadian media, experiences of the Second Intifada, as well as the trauma of 9/11, have shaped the specific iteration of the “terrorism” frame. As such, deconstructing the assumptions that have informed the “terrorism” frame in the Second Intifada, and charting how it became increasingly dominant in the period *prior to 9/11* can help audiences to better recognize future applications. By recognizing when framing devices such as the “terrorism” frame are being employed in the news media, audiences are better informed of the potential distortions, generalizations, and assumptions that exist within a frame. Since 2001, the prevalence of the “terrorism” frame has continued, if not increased, within the Canadian media. Will Kymlicka argues that proactive policies and tools to promote mutual understanding and respect are “most needed” when immigrants or ‘others’ are perceived as illegitimate, illiberal, and burdensome.¹¹⁹ Thus, awareness of framing, and the potential for distortion that accompanies framing, is vital. In Canada, a country with an increasingly diverse population, awareness of media distortion is especially important. My hope is that this thesis highlights that “terrorism” frames did not spontaneously emerge after 9/11, nor was its dominance inevitable. Rather, that specific events, including, but not limited to, the Second Intifada, and theoretical frameworks, such as the “clash of civilizations” narrative, also influenced the creation of the “terrorism” frame.

¹¹⁹ Will Kymlicka, *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012), 24.

There were two main challenges encountered in writing this thesis. First, representativeness. There is an immense volume of primary sources related to this topic, even within the narrowed perimeters I have set. A project of this length required significant culling of sources, meaning I was forced to draw boundaries around what sources would be included and what would be excluded. These boundaries are ultimately arbitrary delineations, but I have attempted to be diligent in my selection of sources. Media as a medium also presents challenges for the representativeness. The voices highlighted in mass media are often little more than a sliver of the varied opinions held by the public, and unfortunately, this sliver frequently excludes minorities, and can be influenced by factors such as money and power.

Second, is generalization. Much of what I have critiqued in this paper is the inherent challenges that narrative mediums like news media present, most predominantly, the tendency of news frames to create generalizations that can perpetuate harmful stereotypes and biases. Yet, I have produced a narrative which ultimately relies on, and creates, its own set of generalizations. Historical narratives such as this thesis, are, as Hayden White states, “invented as much as found.”¹²⁰ This is not to say that the historian sets out to bend or manipulate the evidence to a preconceived structure. Rather, White’s statement highlights that historical narratives are *created* entities. The efficacy of historical narrative lies in the transformation of mere chronicles into narrative stories. Yet the structure of narrative is woefully inadequate to capture the evidence available. Despite criticism, the narrative remains the primary genre for historians, not because it claims to create objective accounts or chronologies, but because it is immensely effective at

¹²⁰ Hayden White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” *Tropics of Discourse* (1978): 83.

persuasion. Thus, it is vital to be cognizant of the shortcomings of narrative as a medium, both in history and in journalism.

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Appendix

Date	Author	Publication	Frame Coding
July 4, 2000	King, Laura	The Globe and Mail	HR
July 14, 2000	Associated Press	The Globe and Mail	HR
July 17, 2000	AP, Rueters and Cox News Service	The Globe and Mail	HR
July 24, 2000	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
July 26, 2000	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	HR
August 28, 2000	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	HR
September 1, 2000	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	HR
September 19, 2000	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
October 5, 2000	Heller, Mark	The Globe and Mail	HR
October 7, 2000	Toameh, Khaled Abu	The Globe and Mail	T
October 11, 2000	Freeze, Colin and Amy Carmichael	The Globe and Mail	T
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October 28, 2000	Myre, Oreo	The Globe and Mail	T
November 4, 2000	Ibittson, John	The Globe and Mail	T
November 16, 2000	Ron, James	The Globe and Mail	HR
November 23, 2000	Toameh, Khaled Abu	The Globe and Mail	T
November 24, 2000	Abu El Uon, Sakher	The Globe and Mail	HR
January 6, 2001	Koring, Paul	The Globe and Mail	HR
January 15, 2001	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
February 8, 2001	York, Geoffrey	The Globe and Mail	T
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May 16, 2000	The Globe and Mail	The Globe and Mail	T

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June 1, 2001	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
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June 5, 2001	AP and Rueters	The Globe and Mail	T
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June 14, 2001	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
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June 23, 2001	Crabb, Roger	The Globe and Mail	T
July 9, 2001	Associated Press	The Globe and Mail	T
July 20, 2001	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
July 27, 2001	Lavie, Mark.	The Globe and Mail	T
August 1, 2001	Kalman, Matthew	The Globe and Mail	T
August 6, 2001	Rotem, Mike	The Globe and Mail	T
August 10, 2001	Morris, Stephanie	The Globe and Mail	T
August 13, 2001	Myre, Oreo	The Globe and Mail	T
September 11, 2001	Adams, Paul	The Globe and Mail	T
July 1, 2000	National Post	National Post	HR
July 6, 2000	Pipes, Daniel, and, Mimi Stillman	National Post	T
July 26, 2000	Kaplow, Larry	National Post	HR
July 26, 2000	Pipes, Daniel	National Post	T
July 26, 2000	Lochery, Neill	National Post	HR
July 26, 2000	Taylor, Paul	National Post	HR
July 26, 2000	National Post	National Post	HR
August 21, 2000	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	HR
September 12, 2000	Lochery, Neill	National Post	T
October 5, 2000	Lochery, Neill	National Post	HR
October 6, 2000	Philips, Alan	National Post	HR

October 9, 2000	Rose, Alexander	National Post	HR
October 13, 2000	O'Sullivan, Arieih	National Post	T
October 13, 2000	Vincent, Isabel	National Post	HR
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October 16, 2000	Graham, Patrick	National Post	T
October 17, 2000	Graham, Patrick	National Post	T
October 17, 2000	Bell, Stewart	National Post	T
October 19, 2000	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	T
October 19, 2000	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	T
October 19, 2000	Krauthammer, Charles	National Post	T
November 6, 2000	Amiel, Barbara	National Post	HR
November 9, 2000	Doidge, Norman	National Post	T
November 16, 2000	National Post	National Post	HR
December 4, 2000	Bell, Stewart	National Post	T
December 30, 2000	Philips, Alan	National Post	T
January 17, 2001	Philips, Alan	National Post	T
February 5, 2001	Doidge, Norman	National Post	T
February 7, 2001	Pleming, Sue	National Post	T
February 15, 2001	Lochery, Neill	National Post	T
February 22, 2001	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	T
February 23, 2001	Bellavance Joel-Denis, and Stewart Bell	National Post	T
March 7, 2001	Lochery, Neill	National Post	T
March 19, 2001	Edwards, Steven	National Post	T
March 29, 2001	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	T
March 31, 2001	National Post	National Post	T
April 10, 2001	Lochery, Neill	National Post	HR
April 23, 2001	Philips, Alan	National Post	T

April 25, 2001	Goodspeed, Peter	National Post	T
May 3, 2001	Bell, Stewart	National Post	T
May 10, 2001	Philips, Alan	National Post	T
June 4, 2001	National Post	National Post	T
June 11, 2001	National Post	National Post	T
June 13, 2001	Bell, Stewart	National Post	T
July 6, 2001	National Post	National Post	T
July 18, 2001	Bell, Stewart	National Post	T
August 2, 2001	Gilmore, Inigo	National Post	T
August 4, 2001	National Post	National Post	T